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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE S'T'ATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-v-

JERRY L. LOCKE,

Case No.

19067

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, JERRY L. LOCKE, was convicted in a criminal
proceeding of the offenses of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony, and
Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, before the Honorable Scott Daniels,
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Appellant was convicted in a trial to the bench of
Burglary, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of §76-6-202, Utah
:ode Annotated (1953 as amended), and Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor,

1

Ln

violation of §76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

He was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison for the
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years for the Second Degree
Felony, and for the term of one year for the Class A Misdemeanor
The sentences were ordered to run concurrentlv with each other and
also concurrently with sentences for other convictions the APnel
lane is presently serving at the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the convictions and the judg·
ments rendered below, and requests the Court remand the case to the
trial court for entry of an order not inconsistent with the opinion
of this Court upon a finding of insufficient evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On or about December 6, 1981, at 4341 West 5415 South,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Appellant allegedly burglarized the home of Carol L. and Wendell Hibler and stole nroperty
belonging to them, the value of said prooerty being more than
$100.00 but less then $250.00 (T.29).

The testimony adduced from

Mrs. Carol L. Hibler was that upon returning to her home at 10:00
p.m. she noted that it was cold in the interior of the house and
that a window in a back bedroom was open (T.41).

Upon looking out

the window, Mrs. Hibler and her husband, who has since passed awav,
saw a stool belonging to them underneath the window (T 39).

The

open window was of the type that could only be ooened by
a lever from the inside (T.41).

There was no evidence of any

glass having been broken or any portion of the window or accomnan"·
ing storm screen having been pushed back.
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Further investigation indicated to the Hiblers that a
renny bank, (T.44), three one-dollar bills (T.45), and a silver
necklace (T.45) were missing from the dresser area of the bedroom.
The value of the necklace was approximately $120.00 (T.48).

A

st1bsequent police investigation consisted of a Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office Deputy coming to the address and dusting for
fingerprints.

Two single latent prints removed from the outside

pane of the open window by a Salt Lake County Sheriff I.D. Technician, John Bell, were subsequently compared to and identified
as being those of the Appellant, Jerry L. Locke (T.107).

Over

defense counsel's objection at trial, Bell testified aa to his conclusions that the latent prints were those of the Appellant (T.114-9).
The testimony of a neighbor, Geri Winkler, was that
although she passed a male individual walking from the general
direction of the Hibler residence, she could only say the Aonellant
"resembled him." (T. 71.)

Mrs. Winkler also acknowledged that at

the Preliminary Hearing she did not identify the Aopellant as the
individual she passed the evening of December 6, 1981 (T.75).
ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ALLOWING THE
TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WHO WAS UNQUALIFIED UNDER
RULE 702, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, states the following concecning testimony by experts:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence, or to determine a fact in
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issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
(Emphasis added)
Application of this rule is, however, by definition not absolute
It is limited by the restriction that before receiving the conclusions or opinions of an "expert," a determination must be made
as to whether the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill, exoerience, training, or education.
Appellant contends the expert offered by the State, whose
testimony provided the only evidence against the Defendant, was unqualified by education and experience to render an opinion as to
the latent fingerprints found.
Generally, a trial court has wide discretion in passing
upon the qualification of a witness offered as an expert.

People

v. Chambers, 328 P.2d 236 (Cal. 1958); and, the Utah Supreme Court
has held that law enforcement officers, if experienced, are competent to render opinions, State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977),
However, in those cases where Appellate review by other
state supreme courts has specifically addressed the question of
competence of individuals to testify concerning fingerprint evidence
each court has looked directly at the individual qualifications
relating to the education, experience, and training of the person
offered as the expert before determining the correctness of the
trial court's ruling.
The relevant question, then, becomes, "What are the minimum standards which must be met by a witness offered as an expert
in the area of fingerprint analysis before being allowed to testif 1
and render an opinion?

II
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Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, John Bell, testified
ro the following experiences, which the State argued qualified
l1im

as an expert in the area of fingerprint identification, and

therefore, made him a competent witness.
1)

He testified that:

He had been, at the time of trial, February 9, 1983,

in the identification section of the Sheriff's Department for
one and a half years (T.107); 2)

He had graduated from the

Institute of Applied Science in July, 1980 (T.107); 3)

He had

graduated from a 40-hour advanced FBI latent fingerprint course
in May, 1982 (T.108); 4)

At the time of trial, he had rolled

approximately five sets of known prints per week and had been
doing so 18 months prior to his testimony (T.108); 5)

At the

time of Appellant's trial, he had lifted over 1, 100 latent nrints
(T.110); 6)

He is a member of the International Association for

Identification and receives monthly periodicals (T.110); and 7) At
the time of trial he compared, per week, approximately 5 latent
prints against known inked impressions (T.110).
Yet, before rendering a conclusion concerning print identification, defense counsel through voir dire questioning and cross
examination gleaned further information as to the extensiveness
of the qualifications of the proposed expert:

1)

Only 75 Percent

of the witness' time in the Identification Division is spent in
the area of fingerprint work

(T .114); 2)

Fourteen months had

elapsed between the time the witness completed the correspondence
course and his being placed in the Identification Division (T.115),
and that the witness had been an ID Technician only two weeks at the
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time of the Hibler burglary (T.140);

3)

The anolied science

course consisted of 13 lesson plans completed over a 13-month
period during which the witness never met with an instructor
(T.117); 4)

The only reading the witness had done, outside

from the monthly sheet distributed within his department, was
from the FBI handbook (T.118); 5) The witness had read "bits and
pieces" of other books which he could not name (T.118); 6)

The

witness was unable to articulate the name of but one author of
an article concerning some area of fingerprinting, but was unable
to say what the article was about and admitted to not having
read it in its entirety (T.120).
Concerning the fingerprint evidence offered against the
Appellant, cross examination further revealed that the witness
could not testify as to when he compared the latent prints found
at the Hibler home with a known inked impression of the Appellant
(T.136); that he could not find his report concerning Appellant's
case (T.136); Appellant's name was suggested for comparison by
the investigating detective and did not result from an independent
classification comparison (T.138); the witness had made no diagram
depicting the location of the latent prints on the window and had
no report at trial to rely on for refreshing his memory (T.145);
although other fingerprint smudges were found suggesting the possibility of other or different prints on the window, no notes were
made or kept by the witness (T.148); a latent print of a nerson
other than the Appellant and the Hiblers was found but not comoared
with any other individuals' known prints (T.155).
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Despite this testimony, the trial court overruled
defense counsel's motion objecting to the rendering of a con,_lusion by the witness, thereby committing nrejudicial error.
The issue of qualification has been raised before and in
each case, where the appellate courts determined to uphold the
trial court's ruling it was based on qualifications far stronger
than those of Bell.

In Hardison v. State, 437 P.2d 868 (Nev. 1968),

the court ruled admissible the testimony of an officer after it
found a background of 6 months formal training on fingerprint
classification and identification methods, 16 months of in-service
training, and the lifting of 1,000 latent prints by the time of
the witness' involvement in the Hardison case.

Another Nevada

case, Collins v. State. 488 P.2d 544 (Nev. 1971), found the
witness qualified where a home-study course was finished, but
where there had been a minimum of 24 months in-service training,
with over 1,000 comparisons made.

The issue of completion of the

FBI training course was addressed in State v. Thomas, 553 P.2d 1357
(Wash. 1976).

This training, when coupled with 9 years exoerience

as a law enforcement officer with 1 1/2 years in the Identification
Division and a college degree in law enforcement, was deemed
sufficient.
In the case of State v. Watson, 587 P.2d 835 (Idaho 1978),
the Supreme Court of Idaho was asked to find unqualified a police
officer with 250 hours of schooling in fingerprint identification
who had read extensively in the field of fingerprinting and had
processed 20,000 sets during his career.
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Although in the cited cases each appellant was unsuccess
ful in convincing the court of the lack of education and experience of that witness, the facts addressed by the Idaho Court
reveal a witness brought into question who was far more qualified
than Deputy Bell.

Appellant argues that Bell is even less educatec

and under-qualified than the witnesses whose testimonies were
accepted.
The California case of People v. Chambers, suora, stands
for the principle that, despite the general rule, trial courts are
not bound to accept the testimony of exnert witnesses if the court
determines they are unqualified.

For example, a

witness,

although not a police officer, had a college degree in criminology,
read books on the subject of fingerprinting, discussed the subject
with people in the field, and had lifted latent prints and made
comparisons with known prints.

His testimony was stricken as

incompetent despite the offering party's reliance on such authorities as Fricke on California Criminal Evidence, 3d.Ed., 141-3,
and cases cited therein to the effect that, although a witness
has not had any personal experience, he may still be qualified to
testify on a subject which he is shown to be familiar as a result
of study, reading, and education.
The above cases are distinquishable and the rulings,
thereby, inapplicable except as to provide a means by which to
measure Bell's qualifications.
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CONCLUSION
Although the trial judge was also the trier of fact,
the conclusions reached by a witness so inexperience<l, uneducated,
and unprepared as was Officer Bell, could not have been convincing
beyond a reasonable doubt and it is only fair to conclude that the
trial judge, once having made an evidentiary ruling, felt bound by
that ruling.

Prejudicial error was committed requiring that the

Defendant's convictions be overturned.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED chi' ;;;-

JOIID.
C. 1'ELLS
Attorney nr Defendant/Appellant
DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84114, this

___L_

day of

1984.
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